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Fast Company has been covering a sea change in American business over the last 15 years or so. Companies big and small have embraced the idea that they ought to be accountable not just to shareholders but to all stakeholdersincluding workers, customers, communities, suppliers, and the planet. Some refer to it as stakeholder capitalism. Others like conscious capitalism. And for those of you who prefer woke capitalism, hey, thanks for joining us. But then, within the last year or two, it all fell apart. Even before Trump retook the presidency, CEOs had begun shuttering DEI programs and climate initiatives, and clamming up about the greater good they were pursuing. What happened? How did a megatrend that transformed boardrooms and C-suites unravel so rapidly? Thats the big question we asked James Surowiecki to dissect in this issues cover story, How Business for Good Went Bad.” Surowiecki, a veteran business journalist and author of The Wisdom of Crowds, does not disappoint. He deftly explicates a number of questions inside the big one. Perhaps the most disturbing: Was corporate Americas embrace of stakeholder capitalism ever real in the first place? In addition to those big words on the cover, Id like to call your attention to some smaller type: Summer 2025. Yes, our print magazine is now quarterly, down from five issues last year. Id like to explain the thinking behind this change, and what it means for the print magazine. Theres no point in denying the obvious: Print media aint what it used to be. I wouldnt be much of a business journalist myself if I pretended otherwise. Fast Company is susceptible to the same shifting business dynamics and consumer behavior that have forced countless publishers to cut back or eliminate their print products. And yet! We still believe deeply in print. We know that it delivers a special kind of experience for readers, one that no other medium can match. The beautiful, tactile object you are holding was reported, written, edited, and designed specifically to allow you to engage with the latest ideas of the innovation economy without the distraction and chaos of the daily news cycle. Read it on the weekend, ideally in a hammock. The coverage areas will be familiar: tech, design, marketing and branding, creativity, social impact, the future of work, and more. But unlike the up-to-the-minute news coverage youll find on fastcompany.com and our social channels, the magazine offers a view from 30,000 feet. In every article, data report, photo essay, long-form interview, and list of recognition program winners, our reporters analyze and contextualize industry trends, take readers deep inside the worlds most compelling companies, and mine the wisdom of the business leaders who are building tomorrows world today. We hope you enjoy it, and we welcome your feedback at editor@fastcompany.com. Mnuka Slab was designed in 2021 by Kris Sowersby for Klim Type Foundry A playful punch For this issues headline typeface, we chose Mnuka Slab. Its tall, condensed proportions are like a typographic punch in the guts, says designer Kris Sowersby, making it perfect for an issue that explores how stakeholder capitalism got the wind knocked out of it. Mnuka is inspired by 19th-century wood type, evoking posters that promoted the circus and civil protest. But it has a lighter side: Check out the pigtail of the uppercase Q and the ball terminal of the Jfitting for the issues tribute to Sharpie markers. And like Sharpies, condensed typefaces never go out of style. Mike Schnaidt, creative director
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President Donald Trumps idea of a Golden Dome missile defense system carries a range of potential strategic dangers for the United States. Golden Dome is meant to protect the U.S. from ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles, and missiles launched from space. Trump has called for the missile defense to be fully operational before the end of his term in three years. Trumps goals for Golden Dome are likely beyond reach. A wide range of studies makes clear that even defenses far more limited than what Trump envisions would be far more expensive and less effective than Trump expects, especially against enemy missiles equipped with modern countermeasures. Countermeasures include multiple warheads per missile, decoy warheads, and warheads that can maneuver or are difficult to track, among others. Regardless of Golden Domes feasibility, there is a long history of scholarship about strategic missile defenses, and the weight of evidence points to the defenses making their host country less safe from nuclear attack. Im a national security and foreign policy professor at Harvard University, where I lead Managing the Atom, the universitys main research group on nuclear weapons and nuclear energy policies. For decades, Ive been participating in dialogues with Russian and Chinese nuclear expertsand their fears about U.S. missile defenses have been a consistent theme throughout. Russian President Vladmir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping have already warned that Golden Dome is destabilizing. Along with U.S. offensive capabilities, Golden Dome poses a threat of directly undermining global strategic stability, spurring an arms race, and increasing conflict potential both among nuclear-weapon states and in the international arena as a whole, a joint statement from China and Russia said. While that is a propaganda statement, it reflects real concerns broadly held in both countries. History lessons Experience going back half a century makes clear that if the administration pursues Golden Dome, it is likely to provoke even larger arms buildups, derail already-dim prospects for any negotiated nuclear arms restraint, and perhaps even increase the chances of nuclear war. My first book, 35 years ago, made the case that it would be in the U.S. national security interest to remain within the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which strictly limited U.S. and Sovietand later Russianmissile defenses. The U.S. and the Soviet Union negotiated the ABM Treaty as part of SALT I, the first agreements limiting the nuclear arms race. It was approved in the Senate 98-2. The ABM Treaty experience is instructive for the implications of Golden Dome today. Why did the two countries agree to limit defenses? First and foremost, because they understood that unless each sides defenses were limited, they would not be able to stop an offensive nuclear arms race. If each side wants to maintain the ability to retaliate if the other attacks (Dont nuke me, or Ill nuke you), then an obvious answer to one side building up more defenses is for the other to build up more nuclear warheads. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets installed 100 interceptors to defend Moscow, so the U.S. targeted still more warheads on Moscow to overwhelm the defense. Had it ever come to a nuclear war, Moscow would have been even more thoroughly obliterated than if there had been no defense at all. Both sides came to realize that unlimited missile defenses would just mean more offense on both sides, leaving both less secure than before. In addition, nations viewed an adversarys shield as going hand in hand with a nuclear sword. A nuclear first strike might destroy a major part of a countrys nuclear forces. Missile defenses would inevitably be more effective against the reduced, disorganized retaliation that they knew would be coming than they would be against a massive, well-planned surprise attack. That potential advantage to whoever struck first could make nuclear crises even more dangerous. Post-ABM Treaty world Unfortunately, President George W. Bush pulled the United States out of the ABM Treaty in 2002, seeking to free U.S. development of defenses against potential missile attacks from small states such as North Korea. But even now, decades later, the U.S. has fewer missile interceptors deployed (44) than the treaty permitted (100). The U.S. pullout did not lead to an immediate arms buildup or the end of nuclear arms control. But Putin has complained bitterly about U.S. missile defenses and the U.S. refusal to accept any limitation at all on them. He views the U.S. stance as an effort to achieve military superiority by negating Russias nuclear deterrent. Russia is investing heavily in new types of strategic nuclear weapons intended to avoid U.S. missile defenses, from an intercontinental nuclear torpedo to a missile that can go around the world and attack from the south, while U.S. defenses are mainly pointed north toward Russia. Similarly, much of Chinas nuclear buildup appears to be driven by wanting a reliable nuclear deterrent in the face of the U.S.s capability to strike its nuclear forces and use missile defenses to mop up the remainder. Indeed, the Chinese were so angered by South Koreas deployment of U.S.-provided regional defenseswhich they saw as aiding the U.S. ability to intercept Chinese missilesthat they imposed stiff sanctions on South Korea. Fuel to the fire Now Trump wants to go much further, with a defense forever ending the missile threat to the American homeland, with a success rate very close to 100%. I believe that this effort is highly likely to lead to still larger nuclear buildups in Rusia and China. The Putin-Xi joint statement pledges to counter defenses aimed at achieving military superiority. Given the ease of developing countermeasures that are extraordinarily difficult for defenses to overcome, odds are the resulting offense-defense competition will leave the U.S. worse off than before, and a good bit poorer. Putin and Xi made clear that they are particularly concerned about the thousands of space-based interceptors Trump envisions. These interceptors are designed to hit missiles while their rockets are still burning during launch. Most countries are likely to oppose the idea of deploying huge numbers of weapons in space, and these interceptors would be both expensive and vulnerable. China and Russia could focus on further developing anti-satellite weapons to blow a hole in the defense, increasing the risk of space war. Already, there is a real danger that the whole effort of negotiated limits to temper nuclear arms racing may be coming to an end. The last remaining treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, the New START Treaty, expires in February 2026. Chinas rapid nuclear buildup is making many defense officials and experts in Washington, D.C., call for a U.S. buildup in response. Intense hostility all around means that for now, neither Russia nor China is even willing to sit down to discuss nuclear restraints, in treaty form or otherwise. A way forward In my view, adding Golden Dome to this combustible mix would likely end any prospect of avoiding a future of unrestrained and unpredictable nuclear arms competition. But paths away from these dangers are available. It would be quite plausible to design defenses that would provide some protection against attacks from a handful of missiles from North Korea or others that would not seriously threaten Russian or Chinese deterrent forcesand design restraints that would allow all parties to plan their offensive forces knowing what missile defenses they would be facing in the years to come. I believe that Trump should temper his Golden Dome ambitions to achieve his other dream of negotiating a deal to reduce nuclear dangers. Matthew Bunn is a professor of the practice of energy, national security, and foreign policy at Harvard Kennedy School. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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How did Crunchyroll become the powerhouse of the anime world? In this episode of FC Explains, we dive deep into how Crunchyroll transformed from a small streaming service to the global leader in anime distribution. Discover how it helped push anime into mainstream pop culture, influenced the global perception of Japanese media, and changed the entertainment landscape forever.
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