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President Donald Trumps idea of a Golden Dome missile defense system carries a range of potential strategic dangers for the United States. Golden Dome is meant to protect the U.S. from ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles, and missiles launched from space. Trump has called for the missile defense to be fully operational before the end of his term in three years. Trumps goals for Golden Dome are likely beyond reach. A wide range of studies makes clear that even defenses far more limited than what Trump envisions would be far more expensive and less effective than Trump expects, especially against enemy missiles equipped with modern countermeasures. Countermeasures include multiple warheads per missile, decoy warheads, and warheads that can maneuver or are difficult to track, among others. Regardless of Golden Domes feasibility, there is a long history of scholarship about strategic missile defenses, and the weight of evidence points to the defenses making their host country less safe from nuclear attack. Im a national security and foreign policy professor at Harvard University, where I lead Managing the Atom, the universitys main research group on nuclear weapons and nuclear energy policies. For decades, Ive been participating in dialogues with Russian and Chinese nuclear expertsand their fears about U.S. missile defenses have been a consistent theme throughout. Russian President Vladmir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping have already warned that Golden Dome is destabilizing. Along with U.S. offensive capabilities, Golden Dome poses a threat of directly undermining global strategic stability, spurring an arms race, and increasing conflict potential both among nuclear-weapon states and in the international arena as a whole, a joint statement from China and Russia said. While that is a propaganda statement, it reflects real concerns broadly held in both countries. History lessons Experience going back half a century makes clear that if the administration pursues Golden Dome, it is likely to provoke even larger arms buildups, derail already-dim prospects for any negotiated nuclear arms restraint, and perhaps even increase the chances of nuclear war. My first book, 35 years ago, made the case that it would be in the U.S. national security interest to remain within the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which strictly limited U.S. and Sovietand later Russianmissile defenses. The U.S. and the Soviet Union negotiated the ABM Treaty as part of SALT I, the first agreements limiting the nuclear arms race. It was approved in the Senate 98-2. The ABM Treaty experience is instructive for the implications of Golden Dome today. Why did the two countries agree to limit defenses? First and foremost, because they understood that unless each sides defenses were limited, they would not be able to stop an offensive nuclear arms race. If each side wants to maintain the ability to retaliate if the other attacks (Dont nuke me, or Ill nuke you), then an obvious answer to one side building up more defenses is for the other to build up more nuclear warheads. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets installed 100 interceptors to defend Moscow, so the U.S. targeted still more warheads on Moscow to overwhelm the defense. Had it ever come to a nuclear war, Moscow would have been even more thoroughly obliterated than if there had been no defense at all. Both sides came to realize that unlimited missile defenses would just mean more offense on both sides, leaving both less secure than before. In addition, nations viewed an adversarys shield as going hand in hand with a nuclear sword. A nuclear first strike might destroy a major part of a countrys nuclear forces. Missile defenses would inevitably be more effective against the reduced, disorganized retaliation that they knew would be coming than they would be against a massive, well-planned surprise attack. That potential advantage to whoever struck first could make nuclear crises even more dangerous. Post-ABM Treaty world Unfortunately, President George W. Bush pulled the United States out of the ABM Treaty in 2002, seeking to free U.S. development of defenses against potential missile attacks from small states such as North Korea. But even now, decades later, the U.S. has fewer missile interceptors deployed (44) than the treaty permitted (100). The U.S. pullout did not lead to an immediate arms buildup or the end of nuclear arms control. But Putin has complained bitterly about U.S. missile defenses and the U.S. refusal to accept any limitation at all on them. He views the U.S. stance as an effort to achieve military superiority by negating Russias nuclear deterrent. Russia is investing heavily in new types of strategic nuclear weapons intended to avoid U.S. missile defenses, from an intercontinental nuclear torpedo to a missile that can go around the world and attack from the south, while U.S. defenses are mainly pointed north toward Russia. Similarly, much of Chinas nuclear buildup appears to be driven by wanting a reliable nuclear deterrent in the face of the U.S.s capability to strike its nuclear forces and use missile defenses to mop up the remainder. Indeed, the Chinese were so angered by South Koreas deployment of U.S.-provided regional defenseswhich they saw as aiding the U.S. ability to intercept Chinese missilesthat they imposed stiff sanctions on South Korea. Fuel to the fire Now Trump wants to go much further, with a defense forever ending the missile threat to the American homeland, with a success rate very close to 100%. I believe that this effort is highly likely to lead to still larger nuclear buildups in Rusia and China. The Putin-Xi joint statement pledges to counter defenses aimed at achieving military superiority. Given the ease of developing countermeasures that are extraordinarily difficult for defenses to overcome, odds are the resulting offense-defense competition will leave the U.S. worse off than before, and a good bit poorer. Putin and Xi made clear that they are particularly concerned about the thousands of space-based interceptors Trump envisions. These interceptors are designed to hit missiles while their rockets are still burning during launch. Most countries are likely to oppose the idea of deploying huge numbers of weapons in space, and these interceptors would be both expensive and vulnerable. China and Russia could focus on further developing anti-satellite weapons to blow a hole in the defense, increasing the risk of space war. Already, there is a real danger that the whole effort of negotiated limits to temper nuclear arms racing may be coming to an end. The last remaining treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, the New START Treaty, expires in February 2026. Chinas rapid nuclear buildup is making many defense officials and experts in Washington, D.C., call for a U.S. buildup in response. Intense hostility all around means that for now, neither Russia nor China is even willing to sit down to discuss nuclear restraints, in treaty form or otherwise. A way forward In my view, adding Golden Dome to this combustible mix would likely end any prospect of avoiding a future of unrestrained and unpredictable nuclear arms competition. But paths away from these dangers are available. It would be quite plausible to design defenses that would provide some protection against attacks from a handful of missiles from North Korea or others that would not seriously threaten Russian or Chinese deterrent forcesand design restraints that would allow all parties to plan their offensive forces knowing what missile defenses they would be facing in the years to come. I believe that Trump should temper his Golden Dome ambitions to achieve his other dream of negotiating a deal to reduce nuclear dangers. Matthew Bunn is a professor of the practice of energy, national security, and foreign policy at Harvard Kennedy School. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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How did Crunchyroll become the powerhouse of the anime world? In this episode of FC Explains, we dive deep into how Crunchyroll transformed from a small streaming service to the global leader in anime distribution. Discover how it helped push anime into mainstream pop culture, influenced the global perception of Japanese media, and changed the entertainment landscape forever.
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Every year, massive data breaches harm the public. The targets are email service providers, retailers and government agencies that store information about people. Each breach includes sensitive personal information such as credit and debit card numbers, home addresses, and account usernames and passwords from hundreds of thousandsand sometimes millionsof people. When National Public Data, a company that does online background checks, was breached in 2024, criminals gained the names, addresses, dates of birth, and national identification numbers such as Social Security numbers of 170 million people in the U.S., U.K., and Canada. The same year, hackers who targeted Ticketmaster stole the financial information and personal data of more than 560 million customers. As a criminologist who researches cybercrime, I study the ways that hackers and cybercriminals steal and use peoples personal information. Understanding the people involved helps us to better recognize the ways that hacking and data breaches are intertwined. In so-called stolen data markets, hackers sell personal information they illegally obtain to others, who then use the data to engage in fraud and theft for profit. The quantity problem Every piece of personal data captured in a data breacha passport number, Social Security number, or login for a shopping servicehas inherent value. Offenders can use the information in different ways. They can assume someone elses identity, make a fraudulent purchase, or steal services such as streaming media or music. The quantity of information, whether Social Security numbers or credit card details, that can be stolen through data breaches is more than any one group of criminals can efficiently process, validate, or use in a reasonable amount of time. The same is true for the millions of email account usernames and passwords, or access to streaming services that data breaches can expose. This quantity problem has enabled the sale of information, including personal financial data, as part of the larger cybercrime online economy. !function(){"use strict";window.addEventListener("message",(function(a){if(void 0!==a.data["datawrapper-height"]){var e=document.querySelectorAll("iframe");for(var t in a.data["datawrapper-height"])for(var r,i=0;r=e[i];i++)if(r.contentWindow===a.source){var d=a.data["datawrapper-height"][t]+"px";r.style.height=d}}}))}(); The sale of data, also known as carding, references the misuse of stolen credit card numbers or identity details. These illicit data markets began in the mid-1990s through the use of credit card number generators used by hackers. They shared programs that randomly generated credit card numbers and details and then checked to see whether the fake account details matched active cards that could then be used for fraudulent transactions. As more financial services were created and banks allowed customers to access their accounts through the internet, it became easier for hackers and cybercriminals to steal personal information through data breaches and phishing. Phishing involves sending convincing emails or SMS text messages to people to trick them into giving up sensitive information such as logins and passwords, often by clicking a false link that seems legitimate. One of the first phishing schemes targeted America Online users to get their account information to use their internet service at no charge. Selling stolen data online The large amount of information criminals were able to steal from such schemes led to more vendors offering stolen data to others through different online platforms. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, offenders used Internet Relay Chat, or IRC channels, to sell data. IRC was effectively like modern instant messaging systems, letting people communicate in real time through specialized software. Criminals used these channels to sell data and hacking services in an efficient place. In the early 2000s, vendors transitioned to web forums where individuals advertised their services to other users. Forums quickly gained popularity and became successful businesses with vendors selling stolen credit cards, malware, and related goods and services to misuse personal information and enable fraud. One of the more prominent forums from this time was ShadowCrew, which formed in 2002 and operated until being taken down by a joint law enforcement operation in 2004. Their members trafficked more than 1.7 million credit cards in less than three years. Forums continue to be popular, though vendors transitioned to running their own web-based shops on the open internet and dark web, which is an encrypted portion of the web that can be accessed only through specialized browsers like TOR, starting in the early 2010s. These shops have their own web addresses and distinct branding to attract customers, and they work in the same way as other e-commerce stores. More recently, vendors of stolen data have also begun to operate on messaging platforms such as Telegram and Signal to quickly connect with customers. Cybercriminals and customers Many of the people who supply and operate the markets appear to be cybercriminals from Eastern Europe and Russia who steal data and then sell it to others. Markets have also been observed in Vietnam and other parts of the world, though they do nt get the same visibility in the global cybersecurity landscape. The customers of stolen data markets may reside anywhere in the world, and their demands for specific data or services may drive data breaches and cybercrime to provide the supply. The goods Stolen data is usually available in individual lots, such as a persons credit or debit card and all the information associated with the account. These pieces are individually priced, with costs differing depending on the type of card, the victims location and the amount of data available related to the affected account. Vendors frequently offer discounts and promotions to buyers to attract customers and keep them loyal. This is often done with credit or debit cards that are about to expire. Some vendors also offer distinct products such as credit reports, Social Security numbers and login details for different paid services. The price for pieces of information varies. A recent analysis found credit card data sold for $50 on average, while Walmart logins sold for $9. However, the pricing can vary widely across vendors and markets. Illicit payments Vendors typically accept payment through cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin that are difficult for law enforcement to trace. Once payment is received, the vendor releases the data to the customer. Customers take on a great deal of the risk in this market because they cannot go to the police or a market regulator to complain about a fraudulent sale. Vendors may send customers dead accounts that are unable to be used or give no data at all. Such scams are common in a market where buyers can depend only on signals of vendor trust to increase the odds that the data they purchase will be delivered, and if it is, that it pays off. If the data they buy is functional, they can use it to make fraudulent purchases or financial transactions for profit. The rate of return can be exceptional. An offender who buys 100 cards for $500 can recoup costs if only 20 of those cards are active and can be used to make an average purchase of $30. The result is that data breaches are likely to continue as long as there is demand for illicit, profitable data. This article is part of a series on data privacy that explores who collects your data, what and how they collect, who sells and buys your data, what they all do with it, and what you can do about it. Thomas Holt is a professor of criminal justice at Michigan State University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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